FLIGHT 182. Today, the skies around major airports are much more tightly monitored than they were in 1978, as controllers have access to an abundance of data that they can use to prevent separation problems before they arise and on the rare occasions when they do, pilots no longer have to rely solely on see and avoid, as TCAS now provides a third layer of redundancy. The system had been commissioned just seven weeks earlier, and already averaged 13 conflict alerts a day and in every case pilots had taken steps to avoid calamity, without any nudging from the control tower. 09.00:38 TWR PSA one eighty-two, Lindbergh tower, ah, traffic twelve o'clock one mile a Cessna09.00:41 CAM-2 Flaps five. At the time, PSA Flight 182 was the U.S.'s deadliest commercial air disaster, surpassed eight months later on Friday, May 25, 1979, when American Airlines Flight 191 (a McDonnell Douglas DC-10) crashed in Chicago. Although hospitals across the region prepared for an influx of patients, it was clear as soon as paramedics arrived at the scene that there were very few victims for them to save. But change would not come immediately first, one rogue investigator would have to go on the record urging a greater reckoning than his colleagues were willing to endorse. Its bad! said Fox, trying in vain to level the plane. With other doctors and nurses, Wisniew worked into the night. The partial list of those aboard the aircraft included: CREW -Capt. Steve Howell, covering a nearby press conference for NBC 7/39, trained his camera upwards and caught fragments of the Cessna and what looked like a body falling to earth. You cant believe it, said WT Bradbury, a policeman on the scene. Always try The first body bags arrived around 10 a.m., Wisniew remembered, and the charred corpses were still hot. Dwane Gallegos, a 20-year-old grocery clerk who was on his way to buy a wedding ring, said, It was coming right at me. Furthermore, when maintaining visual separation from another aircraft, PSA pilots were told that half a nautical mile laterally was an acceptable safe distance, even though this was well within the 1.2-nautical-mile threshold which would trigger a conflict alert in the San Diego approach control center a fact which partially explained why controllers received so many false or marginal alarms every single day.
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