B230315]). John Barnosky, pro se, and Farrel Fritz, Uniondale (Robert Harper of counsel), for John Barnosky and others, objectants-respondents. Reppert did not provide any details as to his medical condition or treatment, but offered to do so in camera upon the court's request. "Furthermore, as the Surrogate's Court also essentially and correctly determined, [Marianne] failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to the enforceability of that obligation, which [Christina] first sought to enforce after the decedent's death, via the imposition of a constructive trust upon certain assets of the decedent's estate" (id.). Although the court retains "inherent discretionary power to relieve a party from a judgment or order for sufficient reason and in the interest of substantial justice" (Galasso, Langione & Botter, LLP v Liotti, 81 AD3d 884, 885 [2011]; see Ladd v Stevenson, 112 NY332 325, 332 [1889]; Katz v Marra, 74 AD3d 888, 890 [2010]), "[a] court's inherent power to exercise control over its judgments is not plenary, and should be resorted to only to relieve a party from{**182 AD3d at 56} judgments taken through [fraud,] mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect" (Matter of McKenna v County of Nassau, Off. It must be recognized that Marianne, by her own statements, knew, as of April 2016, that she would have to find new counsel,{**182 AD3d at 52} though there is nothing in the record that indicates that she knew, or was informed, that there was any deadline or urgency to that search. Harper averred that Marianne was evasive with her answers and Marianne had stated that she was aware that her attorneys had moved for leave to withdraw and that she would be seeking to replace them. Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law 431. Indeed, while this may not have actually been intended, the impression is created, because the objectants made their cross motion at the very moment when Marianne was without counsel to assist her and they did not{**182 AD3d at 57} articulate any claim of urgency, that they were seeking to take unfair advantage of a circumstance over which Marianne had no control, which left her without counsel to assist her at a crucial stage of the case. at 1312). According to McKay, he was told that unless he was appearing for Marianne for all purposes, he would not be permitted to participate in the conference, "thus requiring [McKay] to leave the conference. Second, CPLR 321 (b) (2) permits the attorney of record for a party to be changed by order of the court. It would make little sense to construe the statute as conferring a stay to protect a client who opposed counsel's application to withdraw due to disability, despite knowing of the attorney's incapacity, while denying a stay to a client who, recognizing that the attorney was disabled, did not object to the attorney's{**182 AD3d at 49} request to withdraw. Both CPLR provisions address the replacement of an attorney of record, approaching the topic as if there is but one singular attorney who represents the party in question. The stay provided for in CPLR 321 (c) went into effect upon the Surrogate's Court's finding that Reppert was disabled, which was first made in its orders dated February 16, 2016, relieving RK in the turnover and SNT proceedings. The decedent's will did not provide for the testamentary disposition specified in the PSA, so Christina asserted a claim against the decedent's estate and, essentially, sought to have a constructive trust imposed on certain estate assets (see id. CASSINI
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